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OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO THE SORITES PARADOX
BRUNO DINIS
Abstract. The Sorites paradox is the name of a class of paradoxes that arise
when vague predicates are considered. Vague predicates lack sharp boundaries
in extension and is therefore not clear exactly when such predicates apply.
Several approaches to this class of paradoxes have been made since its first
formulation by Eubulides of Miletus in the IV century BCE. In this paper I
survey some of these approaches and point out some of the criticism that these
approaches have received. A new approach that uses tools from nonstandard
analysis to model the paradox is proposed.
The knowledge came upon me, not quickly, but little by little and
grain by grain.
(Charles Dickens in David Copperfield)
1. To be or not to be a heap
This paper concerns the paradoxes which arise when several orders of mag-
nitude are considered. These paradoxes are part of the larger phenomenon known
as vagueness. Indeed,
[...] vagueness can be seen to be a feature of syntactic categories
other than predicates. Names, adjectives, adverbs and so on are all
susceptible to paradoxical sorites reasoning in a derivative sense.
[20]
Vague predicates share at least the following features:
(1) Admit borderline cases
(2) Lack sharp boundaries
(3) Are susceptible to sorites paradoxes
Borderline cases are the ones where it is not clear whether or not the predicate
applies, independently of how much one knows about it. For instance, most basket-
ball players are clearly tall and most jockeys are clearly not tall. But in many cases
is rather unclear if the person in question is tall, even if one knows its height with
great precision. Furthermore, there is no clear distinction between the set of all tall
people and the set of people that are not tall. These sets lack sharp boundaries.
This leads to a collection of paradoxes called Sorites paradoxes first formulated by
the Ancient Greek philosopher Eubulides of Miletus in the IV century BCE. One
can be stated in the following way: a single grain of wheat cannot be considered as
a heap. Neither can two grains of wheat. One must admit the presence of a heap
sooner or later, so where to draw the line? In fact, the name Sorites derives from
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the Greek word soro´s which means heap. However, one can reconstruct the para-
dox by replacing the term ’heap’ by other vague concepts such as ’tall’, ’beautiful’,
’bald’, ’heavy’, ’cold’, ’rich’,...
The argument consists of a predicate S (the soritical predicate) and a subject
expression an in the series regarding to which S is soritical. The terms of the series
are supposed to be ordered. According to Barnes [1] a predicate S must satisfy
three constraints in order to be considered soritical:
(1) Appear to be valid for a1, the first item in the series;
(2) Appear to be false for ai, the last item in the series;
(3) Each adjacent pair in the series, an and an+1 must be sufficiently similar
as to appear indiscriminable in respect to S.
This means that the predicate S needs to be sufficiently vague in order to allow
small changes. Small changes do not determine the difference between a set of
individual grains and a heap, between a bald man and a hairy one, between a rich
person and a poor one. However, and in spite of the vagueness involved, it also
needs to have a certain area on which S is clearly true and an area on which S is
clearly false.
The difference of one grain would seem to be too small to make
any difference to the application of the predicate; it is a difference
so negligible as to make no apparent difference to the truth-values
of the respective antecedents and consequents.
Yet the conclusion seems false. [20]
This paper surveys some approaches that have been made to deal with the phe-
nomenon of vagueness and the Sorites type paradoxes which arise when vague pred-
icates are used. Also, a new approach that uses tools from nonstandard analysis
to model the paradox is proposed. As mentioned above, soritical arguments are
tolerant to small changes but not tolerant to large changes in relevant aspects. In
fact, using a special class of external sets called external numbers (see Section 4.1)
it is possible to define rigorously what is meant with terms such as ’small changes’
or ’large changes’. The fact that large changes come as the result of the accumu-
lation of small changes is no surprise because it is a very well known fact from
nonstandard analysis that an infinitely large sum of infinitesimals may very well
become appreciable or even infinitely large. In this way, one can make a rigorous
claim that a heap and a set of individual grains of wheat are indeed not of the same
order of magnitude.
2. Forms of the paradox
The Sorites paradox can be stated in various ways. This implies that one cannot
hope to solve the paradox by pointing out a fault particular to any one of those way.
One should instead try and reveal a common fault to all possible forms that the
paradox can take. I do so by considering the (standard) mathematical induction
and conditional schemata. These schemata will be revisited, in Section 4.2, after a
nonstandard point of view is adopted.
2.1. Induction. Mathematical induction is generally used (within standard math-
ematics) to prove that a mathematical statement involving a natural number n
holds for all possible values of n. This is done in two steps. On the first step
(basis) one proves that there is a first element for which the statement holds. On
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the second step (inductive step) one shows that if the statement holds for some n
then it also holds for n+ 1. Then, by the principle of mathematical induction, the
statement is valid for all n. Let S represent a soritical predicate, for example ’is not
a heap’ and let an represent the n-th element in the soritical series. In the example
above it would be the sentence ’n grains of wheat’.
The Sorites paradox can now be represented in the following way:
{
(Sa1 ∧ ∀n (San → San+1))→ ∀nSan
∃ω (¬Saω)
So, if one admits that:
(1) A single grain of wheat is not a heap.
(2) If a collection of n grains of wheat is not a heap then a collection of n+ 1
grains of wheat is also not a heap.
One concludes (by induction) that the heap will never appear. Since at some
point the heap is obviously there one might come to the conclusion that there
is something wrong with induction or, at least, with applying induction to vague
predicates.
2.2. Conditional form. The conditional form of the Sorites paradox is the most
common form throughout the literature. Using the notation of the previous section
it can be formalized in the following way:
If 

Sa1
Sa1 → Sa2
Sa2 → Sa3
...
Sai → Sai+1
∃j (¬Saj)
Assuming Sa1, Sa1 → Sa2, Sa2 → Sa3, ..., Sai → Sai+1, by modus ponens, the
conclusion is Sai, where i can be arbitrarily large. This is a fairly simple reasoning
where the premises are: a single grain of wheat does not make a heap; if one grain
of wheat does not make a heap then two grains of wheat do not form a heap either;
if two grains of wheat do not make a heap then three grains of wheat do not form a
heap either... if i grains of wheat do not make a heap then i+1 grains of wheat do
not form a heap either. The conclusion is that a set of an arbitrarily large number
of grains i does not make a heap. However if one observes that there is a set of j
grains that form a heap it generates a paradox.1
1A reasoning from classical logic was used here and one could think that the paradox may be
circumveined if one would use intuitionistic logic instead. In fact, there have been attempts to use
intuitionistic logic to deal with the paradox (see [31] and its defense [41]). However, according to
Keefe,
[...] critics have shown that with various reasonable additional assumptions,
other versions of sorites arguments still lead to paradox. [...] The bulk of
the criticisms point to the conclusion that there is no sustainable account of
vagueness that emerges from rejecting classical logic in favour of intuitionistic
logic.[21, p. 22]
For the criticism that Keefe refers to the reader may consult [34, 4].
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3. Response attempts
There are several attempts to solve the Sorites paradox. These responses are
divided into the following four types ([21], p. 19-20). A first type of response would
be to deny the validity of the argument, refusing to grant that the conclusion follows
from the premises. Alternatively one can question the strict truth of the inductive
premise (or of one of the conditionals). A third possibility is to accept the validity
of the argument and the truth of its inductive premise (or of all the conditional
premises) but contest the truth of the conclusion. Finally one can grant that there
are good reasons to consider both the argument form as valid, and accept the
premises and deny the conclusion hence proving that the predicate is incoherent.
In this section, some of the responses to the paradox will be reviewed. For
a wider account on this matter see for example [21, 38, 36, 45]. I would like to
emphasize that the theories presented below correspond to a wide variety of related
points of view. This means that there are many versions of the theories presented.
So, when reviewing a theory I tend to give only the general lines, common to the
various versions of that theory.
3.1. Ideal Languages. Natural languages such as English or Vietnamese distin-
guish between intension and extension of terms. The intension is the internal
content of a term or concept while the extension is the range of applicability of a
term by naming the particular objects that the term denotes. The two predicates
’is a creature with a heart’ and ’is a creature with a kidney’ (see [32]) have the
same extension because the set of creatures with hearts and the set of creatures
with kidneys are the same. However, having a heart and having a kidney are very
different things, so one concludes that
terms can name the same thing but differ in meaning. [32]
Hence, the distinction between intension and extension leads necessarily to vague-
ness, ambiguity and indeterminacy of meaning for words and phrases. This is in
part the reason why natural languages are so powerful. In poetry, for example,
beauty is achieved by taking advantage of these features. However, if one needs
clarity and precision of language then she is forced to conclude that natural lan-
guages are not the way to go. According to Quine
The sorites paradox is one imperative reason for precision in science,
along with more familiar reasons. [33]
An ideal language would left out all such factors in order to eliminate any vague-
ness.
The defenders of this response, among them Frege [16], Russell [35] and Wittgen-
stein [47], consider vagueness as a non-eliminable feature of natural language. The
way to avoid vagueness is by creating and using ideal languages instead. This
would mean that arguments of the Sorites type are not valid since they contain
vague expressions.
As stated by Russell,
The fact is that all words are attributable without doubt over a
certain area, but become questionable within a penumbra, outside
which they are again certainly not attributable. Someone might
seek to obtain precision in the use of words by saying that no word
is to be applied in the penumbra, but unfortunately the penumbra
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is itself not accurately definable, and all the vagueness which apply
the primary use of words apply also when we try to fix a limit to
their indubitable applicability. [35]
So, this response implies that it is the philosopher’s job to discover a logically
ideal language. However, this doesn’t seem possible using classical logic:
All traditional logic habitually assumes that precise symbols are
being employed. It is therefore not applicable to this terrestrial
life, but only to an imagined celestial existence. [35]
Russell also believed that
Vagueness, clearly, is a matter of degree, depending upon the ex-
tent of the possible differences between different systems repre-
sented by the same representation. Accuracy, on the contrary, is
an ideal limit. [35]
Ideal languages as a response to the sorites paradox seem to have unsatisfying
features. According to Keefe,
denying the validity of the sorites argument seems to require giving
up absolutely fundamental rules of inference. [21, p. 20]
So, if one chooses to go in this direction fundamental rules such as modus ponens
or mathematical induction are to be put in question. Furthermore, by eliminating
vague predicates from the language one is not solving the paradox but avoiding it
by sweeping it under the rug. In fact, most philosophers nowadays believe that
vagueness is an important part of natural language and cannot be separated from
it.
3.2. The Epistemic theory. The Epistemic theory is based on the idea that the
precise boundaries to knowledge itself cannot be known. Vagueness is seen as a
particular type of ignorance.
The fact that this theory is built in the classical logic framework implies that
there are precise bounds for the extensions of vague predicates even if one does not
know where they are located. For instance, the defenders of the epistemic theory
claim that there is in fact a last grain of wheat in the series before the heap turns up,
even if one is not (nor ever will be) able to identify it definitively. In fact, Williamson
[45] has shown that if there is a precise boundary for penumbral cases one cannot
know where it is. So, soritical predicates are indeterminate in extension but not
semantically. This position has been notably defended by Williamson [45, 46] and
Sorensen [39, 40].
The first and major objection to this theory is its counter-intuitive nature. The
meaning of a word is (usually) determined by its use. According to Wittgenstein
For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ
the word ’meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word
is its use in the language [47]
and
if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should
have to say that it is its use. [48]
For instance, the word ’guitar’ means an actual guitar because one use that word
to mean an actual guitar (even if one does not know how to play). Now, one does
not usually use the word ’heap’ as if a single grain of wheat could make a difference.
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Neither, more generally, does one use any vague term as if it were not tolerant to
small changes. One does not use vague terms as if they had precise borders. In
this sense, Smith [38] claims that the epistemicist is forced to deny a link between
meaning and use.
Another point that deserves criticism is that nothing is said about how predicates
get the precise extensions that they do. It is claimed that there is in fact a last
grain of wheat in the series before the heap turns up. So there should be attempts
to find which one is it [21]. I agree that ignorance is no excuse for the lack of
attempts to find the precise boundaries of vague concepts. There should be at least
some reasons to believe about where these boundaries are.
3.3. Supervaluationism. According to Fine, vagueness is a semantic notion not
to be confused with ambiguity nor undecidability:
Let us say, in a preliminary way, what vagueness is. I take it
to be a semantic notion. Very roughly, vagueness is deficiency
of meaning. As such, it is to be distinguished from generality,
undecidability, and ambiguity. These latter are, if you like, lack of
content, possible knowledge, and univocal meaning, respectively.
[13]
Supervaluationism proposes to solve the problem of vagueness by modifying clas-
sical semantics, using Van Fraassen’s supervaluations. According to Van Fraassen:
A supervaluation over a model is a function that assigns T (F)
exactly to those statements assigned T (F) by all the classical val-
uations over that model. [15]
And he concludes that
Supervaluations have truth-value gaps. [15]
In classical logic the connectives have truth values in a functional way. I recall
that a connective of statements is truth-functional if and only if the truth value of
any compound statement obtained by applying that connective is a function of the
individual truth values of the constituent statements that form the compound. The
classical logic connectives are all truth-functional.2 Supervaluationists abandon the
concept of truth-functionality.
Fine applies the distinction between extension and intension [32] to vagueness:
Extensional vagueness is deficiency of extension, intensional vague-
ness deficiency of intension. Moreover, if intension is the possibility
of extension, then intensional vagueness is the possibility of exten-
sional vagueness. [13]
According to this theory, a vague predicate does not need to have a unique,
sharply bounded, truth function. Vague predicates have things to which they def-
initely apply (positive extension), things to which they definitely do not (nega-
tive extension) and a penumbra (penumbral connections). The penumbra involves
cases which seem to be neither true nor false3 (borderline cases). These penumbral
2This is immediately visible if one computes the logical value of a given sentence using truth
tables or a proof calculus like natural deduction [29].
3Fine warns about the general confusion of under- and over-determinacy.
A vague sentence can be made more precise; and this operation should preserve
truth-value. But a vague sentence can be made to be either true or false, and
therefore the original sentence can be neither. [13]
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connections are instances of truth-value gaps. Truth-value gaps are related with
extensional vagueness. However,
Despite the connection, extensional vagueness should not be defined
in terms of truth-value gaps. This is because gaps can have other
sources, such as failure of reference or presupposition. [13]
Supervaluationists claim, roughly speaking, that a vague sentence is true if and
only if it is true for all ways of making it completely precise [13], called precisifica-
tions. There are then many interpretations or precisifications. Each one of these
precisifications has no penumbra because it behaves according to classical bivalence.
The assignment of truth value for all such precisifications is a supervaluation.
A sentence which is true in all precisifications is called supertrue and a sentence
which is false in all precisifications is called superfalse. A sentence which is true for
some precisifications and false on others is neither true nor false4. This means in
particular that tautologies from classical logic are supertrue.
According to Keefe [21], truth is supertruth, meaning that a sentence is true if
and only if it is true on all admissible precisifications. A precisification is acceptable
only if the extensions of the concepts do not overlap. The truth of a compound
sentence is determined by its truth on every precisification. For a wider account on
supervaluationism the reader is referred to [15, 13, 21].
Fodor and Lepore are particularly critic of the supervaluationist approach to
vagueness:
[...] there is something fundamentally wrong with using supervalu-
ation techniques either for preserving classical logic or for providing
a semantics for linguistic expressions ordinarily thought to produce
truth-value gaps. [14]
However the fault they point out is not of a logical nature. Indeed they say:
Right from the start, however, we want to emphasize that the
objections we are raising are philosophical rather than logical. We
have no argument with supervaluations considered as a piece of
formal mathematics. [14]
Fodor and Lepore point out as the main flaws of supervaluationism the violation
of intuitive semantic principles concerning disjunctions and existential quantifi-
cation, the abandonment of classical rules of inference and the violation of core
principles concerning the concept of truth.
Let S represent the predicate ’is not a heap’. Since all tautologies are supertrue,
¬ (∀n (San → San+1))
is equivalent to
∃n (San ∧ ¬San+1) ,
which, semantically speaking, seems to postulate the existence of a sharp boundary
and looks for that matter like a step back towards the epistemic theory. Also
(S ∨ ¬S) is supertrue. So, for all precisifications one of the statements is true.
However, the statement S is borderline and therefore neither true nor false.
Keefe [21] argues that it is possible to surpass these difficulties at the price of
adding a new operator to the language: the ’definitely’ operator D. This operator
4In fact, not all supervaluationists accept this last sentence.
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is however not closed under certain operations such as contraposition and condi-
tional introduction. So alternatives to the classical closure principles are proposed.
However, this implies that the logic used is no longer classical.
Another argument against supervaluationism is that little information is given
on what makes a precisification acceptable other than saying that precisifications
must respect penumbral connections and therefore their admissibility is a vague
matter. Also, supervaluationism states that precisifications behave in a classical
way and have no penumbra. However, each precisification may divide the positive
and negative extensions in different places.
For more on objections to supervaluationism and attempts to respond to those
objections the reader is referred to [5].
3.4. Many-valued logics. Many-valued logics is a general term that refers to
logics which have more than two truth-values. In these logics the principle of
truth-functionality is accepted and so a sentence remains unaffected when one of its
components is replaced by another with the same truth value. Many-valued logics
became accepted as an independent part of logic with the works of  Lukasiewicz and
Post in the 1920’s. Since then many many-valued logics emerged (e.g. [25, 17, 19,
28]) and it is not possible nor desirable to describe them all in these pages. However
I shall discuss an application of Kleene’s three-valued logic and applications of fuzzy
logics because these seem to be the most relevant in what concerns the phenomenon
of vagueness. For a more complete reference concerning many-valued logics see for
example [18].
3.4.1. Kleene’s three-valued logic. Perhaps one of the simplest and best-known ex-
amples of a many-valued logic is Kleene’s three-valued logic [22]. Kleene thought
of the third truth value as undefined or underdetermined5. So one has three truth-
values: 1 (true), 0 (false) and 1
2
(undefined or unknown). One has truth-tables
for which the connectives are regular, i.e. in terms of ordering, undefined is placed
below both true and false. This means that the behavior of the third truth value
should be compatible with any increase in information. Kleene proposed the fol-
lowing truth-tables for the so-called strong connectives:
p ¬p
1 0
0 1
1
2
1
2
p q p ∨ q p ∧ q p→ q p←→ q
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1
2
1
2
0 1 1
2
1
2
1 1 1
2
1 1
2
1
2
0 1
2
0 1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
These tables are uniquely determined as the strongest possible regular extensions
of the classical two-valued tables. Quantifiers can be defined in the following way:
∃x : P (x) is true if P (x) is true for some value of x and it is false if P (x) is false
5Priest [30] gave an alternative three-valued logic conceiving the third truth-value as overde-
termined, interpreting the symbol 1
2
as being both true and false.
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for all values and indefinite otherwise; ∀xP (x) is true if P (x) is true for all values
of x and false if P (x) is false for some value and indefinite otherwise. Tye [43]
applies Kleene’s three-valued logic to the sorites paradox. However, the objections
made to the bipartite division can also be used to refute a tripartite division. In
fact, Tye [43] claims that
[...] vagueness cannot be reconciled with any precise dividing lines.
because
there is no determinate fact of the matter about where truth-value
changes occur.
That is to say that there is no way to assign precise truth-values to vague terms.
So, as a solution, Tye proposes to use a vague metalanguage. He claims that
there are sets which are genuinely vague items. For instance the set of tall men
has borderline members (men which are neither clearly members nor clearly non-
members of the set).
There is no determinate fact of the matter about there are objects
that are neither members, borderline members, nor non-members.
[43]
Kleene’s three-valued logic has the undesirable feature of having no tautologies,
because the two-valued tautologies can take the value 1
2
in the three-valued case.
As an example consider the law of excluded middle p∨¬p. In Kleene’s three-valued
logic the truth table is the following:
p ¬p p ∨ ¬p
1 0 1
0 1 1
1
2
1
2
1
2
Tye tries to avoid this flaw by saying that a statement is a quasi-tautology if it
has no false substitution instances. So two-valued tautologies become three-valued
quasi-tautologies.
Kleene’s three-valued logic is still a precise formalization and having no tautolo-
gies seems a price too high to pay in order to be able to deal in the above sense
with vagueness. Also, according to Keefe,
[...] the appeal to quasi-tautologies adds nothing: if earning this
title is enough for his [Tye’s] purposes, then the fact that p∨¬p also
earns it should be of concern. Moreover, what matters for validity
does not relate to quasitautologies [sic], and assertion depends on
sentences being true not being either true or indefinite, so the role
for the notion seems to be merely one of appeasement. [21, p. 111]
3.4.2. Fuzzy logics. Fuzzy logics propose a graded notion of inference. Truth-values
range in degree between 0 and 1 in order to capture different degrees of truth. In
this way, the value 0 is attributed to sentences which are completely false and the
value 1 to sentences which are completely true. The remaining sentences are truer
than the false sentences, but not as true as the true ones so they have intermediate
logical values according to ”how true” they are. According to Bogenberger
In fuzzy logic, the truth of any statement becomes a matter of
degree. [3]
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Fuzzy logic is related to Zadeh’s work on fuzzy sets [49]. A fuzzy set A on X is
characterized by a membership function fA (x) with values in the interval [0, 1]. So,
a fuzzy set A is a class of objects that allow a continuum of grades of membership.
The membership degree is then the degree to which the sentence ’x is a member
of A’ is true. So, one can interpret the membership degrees of fuzzy sets as truth
degrees of the membership predicate in a suitable many-valued logic.
Theories of vagueness which recourse to fuzzy logics are advocated most notably
by Machina [26] and Smith [38].
According to these theories the notion of heap is a vague one and it may hold true
of given objects only to some (truth) degree. The premises should be considered
partially true to a degree which is quite near to the maximal degree 1. This inference
has to involve truth degrees for the premises and has to provide a truth degree for
the conclusion in a way that in each step the truth degree becomes smaller. The
sentence ’n grains of sand do not make a heap’ tends toward being false for an
increasing number of grains.
The problem of saying whether the sentence ’a set of n grains makes a heap’ is
true or not is essentially the same as to say that that sentence is true with a certain
(precise) fixed degree. This false precision is perhaps the main objection to the
application of many-valued logics to the sorites paradox. According to Keefe
[T]he degree theorist’s assignments impose precision in a form that
is just as unacceptable as a classical true/false assignment. In so
far as a degree theory avoids determinacy over whether a is F, the
objection here is that it does so by enforcing determinacy over the
degree to which a is F. All predications of “is red” will receive a
unique, exact value, but it seems inappropriate to associate our
vague predicate “red” with any particular exact function from ob-
jects to degrees of truth. For a start, what could determine which
is the correct function, settling that my coat is red to degree 0.322
rather than 0.321? [21, p. 113]
Also, Urquhart states that
One immediate objection which presents itself to [fuzzy logic’s] line
of approach is the extremely artificial nature of the attaching of
precise numerical values to sentences like ‘73 is a large number’
or ‘Picasso’s Guernica is beautiful’. In fact, it seems plausible to
say that the nature of vague predicates precludes attaching pre-
cise numerical values just as much as it precludes attaching precise
classical truth values. [44]
Smith [38] tries to solve this problem, suggesting several possible solutions and
concluding that the best answer is to mix fuzzy logic with a theory called plurivalua-
tionism (not to be confused with supervaluationism6) called fuzzy plurivaluationism.
So, Smith accepts the semantic realism implied by the Epistemic view, but denies
that vague predicates have to refer to a single bivalent model.
6Supervaluationism involves only one intended (non-classical) model relevant to questions con-
cerning meaning and truth, while plurivaluationism allows that there may be multiple (classical)
models.
OLD AND NEW APPROACHES TO THE SORITES PARADOX 11
3.5. Contextualism. Contextualism7 defends that interpretations change over time
or according to context. Such shifts of contexts may occur instantaneously. For
instance, at the beginning of a conversation the context is empty. Then, as the con-
versation goes along, these notions are sharpened in such a way that borderline cases
(undecided so far) get assigned to either the extension or the anti-extension of the
vague predicates in question. In fact, borderline sentences can express something
true in one context and something false in another, so they are context-sensitive. In
this way one can disagree about the truth-values of the propositions expressed by
borderline sentences, even in situations where all the relevant information is avail-
able. This view is most prominently elaborated by Shapiro [36, 37] and DeRose
[7].
Besides contex-sensitivity Shapiro defines as central the concepts of judgment
dependence, open texture, and the principle of tolerance. Judgment dependence
means that both the extensions and anti-extensions for the borderline cases are
solely determined by the decisions of competent speakers. These decisions are put
in (and can be removed from) the conversational record. Open texture means that
for a vague predicate S there exists an object a such that a competent speaker can
decide whether Sa holds or not without her competency being compromised. The
principle of tolerance is defined as follows. Suppose that two objects a, b differ only
marginally in the relevant respect on which a vague predicate S is tolerant. Then
if one competently judges Sa to hold, then Sb also holds.
One reason for skepticism about contextualism is that the problems with vague
expressions seem to remain whether context-sensitivity is taken into account or
not. By taking context into account one can reduce vagueness but not eliminate
completely. Indeed, sets with vague boundaries are invariant to some translations.
Take for instance the word ’ugly’. Even if a particular context is given (and even
if one knows a great deal about another one’s ugliness) there is still no reason to
suppose that there is a sharp boundary between what ’ugly’ applies to and what it
does not.8
Smith [38] argues that contextualism should not be seen as a theory of vagueness
in its own right. He claims that this theory is compatible with all other mentioned
theories.
4. External numbers as a model
In this section a new approach to the Sorites paradox which takes advantage of
notions and concepts from nonstandard analysis is presented. I will start with a
brief description of the necessary concepts to reformulate the paradox and model it
by means of orders of magnitude. Orders of magnitude are given in the form of the
so-called neutrices [24, 11].9 I want to emphasize that the present response models
7Contextualism is often seen as an argument against philosophical skepticism. Skepticism
claims that we don’t actually know what we think we know.
But, according to contextualists, the skeptic, in presenting her argument, ma-
nipulates the semantic standards for knowledge, thereby creating a context in
which she can truthfully say that we know nothing or very little. [7]
8The reader interested in the criticism to Shapiro’s ideas can consult the review of his book
[36] by Matti Eklund, available online at http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/vagueness-in-context/ .
9The term neutrix was coined by Van der Corput in [6] referring to groups of functions, with
the intention of creating a mathematical tool that would enable a rigorous ars negligendi .
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only a specific type of vagueness (of the type Sorites) and therefore is not intended
as a theory for vagueness in general. Also, I am not by any means claiming that
other theories are without value. For instance, the fuzzy logic approach has been
quite successful in solving vagueness related to traffic and transportation processes
(see for example [42, 3, 50] for other examples of applications of fuzzy set theory).
According to Teodorovic´ [42]
[...] a wide range of traffic and transportation engineering parame-
ters are characterized by uncertainty, subjectivity, imprecision and
ambiguity. Human operators, dispatchers, drivers and passengers
use this subjective knowledge or linguistic information on a daily
basis when making decisions.
Also,
The results obtained show that fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic
present a promising mathematical approach to model complex traf-
fic and transportation processes [...]
However the fuzzy logic approach is also not without fault as model of impre-
cision, because it ultimately recourses to precise intervals to model imprecise situ-
ations. Moreover, it does not work with the actual error but only with an upper
bound of the error. Those faults will be corrected with the present proposal.
4.1. Tools from Nonstandard Analysis. An “economical” version of Nonstan-
dard Analysis due to Nelson [27, Chapter 4] (see also [10]) which is enough for the
current purposes is presented below. Add to the language of conventional mathe-
matics a new predicate st. One should read ‘x is standard’ for st(x). A formula
is said to be internal if it does not involve the predicate st (i.e. it is a formula of
conventional mathematics) and external otherwise. Assume the following:
(1) st(0);
(2) ∀n ∈ N(st(n)→ st(n+ 1));
(3) ∃ω(¬st(ω)).
Assume also the following axiom scheme.
External induction.
(Φ(0) ∧ ∀stn(Φ(n)→ Φ(n+ 1)))→ ∀stnΦ(n)
Were Φ is an arbitrary formula, internal or external, and ∀stnΦ(n) is an abbre-
viation of ∀n(st(n)→ Φ(n)). The first two axioms state that the natural numbers
from conventional mathematics are all standard. Nevertheless, the third axiom
states that there exist nonstandard natural numbers. External induction is a form
of induction that allows to conclude that some property is true for all standard
natural numbers by assuming that it is valid for 0 and that if it is valid for some
standard natural number then it is also valid for its successor. Of course, the usual
form of induction is still valid. However, one should be aware that (internal) induc-
tion is a principle from conventional mathematics and is therefore only applicable to
internal formulas. Let me illustrate this with a simple example. Let Φ(n) :≡ st(n).
If we could apply internal induction to Φ the conclusion would be that ∀n st(n),
in contradiction with the third assumption. Induction is applicable to subsets of
natural numbers, so we are forced to conclude that S = {n : st(n)} is not a set.
These kind of classes are sometimes called external sets.
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Even this rather weak version of nonstandard analysis is enough to define differ-
ent orders of magnitude.
Definition 4.1. A real number x is said to be:
(1) limited, if there exists st (n) ∈ N ( i.e., n ∈ N ∧ st (n)) such that |x| ≤ n.
(2) ilimited, or infinitely large if x is not limited.
(3) infinitesimal, ou infinitely small if for any st (n) ∈ N+ one has |x| ≤
1
n
.
(4) appreciable if x is limited but not infinitesimal.
(5) Two real numbers whose distance is infinitesimal are said to be infinitely
close.
Sometimes it is not necessary to know precisely the value of a number to know
its order of magnitude. This point of view together intuitions and calculations from
nonstandard asymptotics [2] lead Koudjeti and Van den Berg [23, 24] to introduce
neutrices and external numbers. A neutrix is an additive convex subgroup of the
reals and an external number is the algebraic sum of a real number with a neutrix.
In a nonstandard framework, due to the existence of infinitesimals, there are many
neutrices such as ⊘, the external set of all infinitesimals, and £, the external set of
all limited numbers (numbers bounded in absolute value by a standard number).
One can view an external number α = a+A as the sum of a real number a with an
“error”, given by a neutrix A. In fact, the rules of calculation for external numbers
are a sort of ”mellowed” version of the common rules of calculation of real numbers.
Indeed, addition and multiplication in the external numbers are defined (with some
abuse of notation) as follows.
Definition 4.2. Let α = a + A and β = b + B be two external numbers, the sum
and product of α and β are defined as follows
α+ β = a+ b+max{A,B}
α · β = ab+max{aB, bA,AB}.
The operations are well-defined because neutrices, being convex subgroups of the
reals, are ordered by inclusion so the maximum of two neutrices is one of them and
because the product of a real number and a neutrix is also a neutrix. Typically,
external numbers are bounded but have neither infimum nor supremum and are
stable for some (but not all!) translations, additions and multiplications. It is not
difficult to prove that if A is a neutrix, then for all standard n it holds that nA = A.
In fact, it holds that cA = A, for every appreciable real number c. However if we
let ω be nonstandard, then A ⊂ ωA. Also, if we let ǫ be infinitesimal we have
ǫ+⊘ = ⊘ and even ⊘+⊘ = ⊘ but ǫ⊘ ⊂ ⊘. In this way, external numbers generate
a calculus of propagation of errors not unlike the calculus of real numbers, allowing
for total order and even for a sort of generalized Dedekind completeness property
[24, 11, 12]. Thus, external numbers seem suitable as models of orders of magnitude
or transitions with imprecise boundaries of the Sorites type, with the advantage
of being possible to work directly with imprecisions and errors without recourse to
upper bounds. Moreover, the external numbers have a rich algebraic structure. The
(external) set of external numbers is a commutative regular semigroup for addition
and the (external) set of external numbers which are not reduced to neutrices forms
a commutative regular semigroup for multiplication. Although the distributive
law does not always hold, necessary and sufficient conditions for it to hold were
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given. Furthermore the structure has no zero divisors and is sufficiently strong to
incorporate combinatorial laws such as the binomial law [11].
A set of individual grains may be modeled by a standard subset of the external
set of limited numbers (positive part of a neutrix) and the set of grains that form
a heap may be modeled by the external set of the infinitely large numbers.
It should also be possible to capture with external sets some modalities, like
the difference between a ”good” approximation, allowing to obtain an adequately
precise numerical result in some context, and a ”bad”, useless, one. The stability
of orders of magnitude under some repeated additions justifies to model them by
(convex) groups of real numbers.
4.2. A nonstandard point of view on paradoxical forms. I propose to replace
the standard forms presented above by the following forms which involve reasoning
with nonstandard methods.
If one replaces mathematical induction by external induction, the reasoning be-
comes: {
(Sa1 ∧ ∀
stn (San → San+1))→ ∀
stnSan
∃ω (¬Saω)
So, if one admits that:
(1) A single grain of wheat is not a heap.
(2) If n is a standard number and if a set of n grains of wheat is not a heap
then a set of n+ 1 grains of wheat is also not a heap.
One concludes that in the presence of a standard number of grains of wheat
one does not have a heap. The heap arises when one has a nonstandard number
ω ≃ +∞ of grains of wheat.
The conditional form, using nonstandard analysis, becomes the following.
Let i be a standard natural number. If

Sa1
Sa1 → Sa2
Sa2 → Sa3
...
Sai → Sai+1
Then, by modus ponens, the conclusion is Sai, for i an arbitrarily large but
(naive) standard number. In nonstandard analysis this is modeled by allowing
modus ponens but only a standard (naive) number of times. One calls ”naive” the
natural numbers which can be obtained from zero by the successive addition of one.
This corresponds to Reeb’s famous slogan:
Les entiers na¨ıfs ne remplissent pas N. [9]
I am in fact claiming that the formalization of the predicate ’is not a heap’ should
be an external predicate, where not being a heap means to possess a standard
number of grains.
Soritical arguments share with external numbers the fact of being tolerant to
small changes but not tolerant to large changes in relevant aspects. In fact, with
external numbers, using the different orders of magnitude, it is possible to define
rigorously what one means with terms such as ’small changes’ or ’large changes’.
The fact that large changes come as the result of the accumulation of small changes
is now a very natural consequence of the theory.
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A simple shift from the classical forms presented in Section 2.1 and in Section
2.2 to the forms using nonstandard concepts presented in Section 4.2 does not
solve the problem. A million grains of wheat should form a heap and yet that is
clearly a standard number of grains. However, both these forms suggest that the
set of individual grains may be modeled by the external set of limited numbers
(positive part of a neutrix) and the set of grains that form a heap may be modeled
by the external set of the infinitely large numbers. Indeed ’precise’ objects possess
sharp bounds and can be modeled by standard sets. ’Vague’ objects have no clear
bounds and should be for this matter modeled by nonstandard sets which are given
by external properties.
As seen in Section 3.2, epistemicists believe in the existence of sharp bounds
for vague concepts, claiming that ignorance is somehow inevitable. The current
proposal takes the opposite direction. Indeed, the tolerance of vague terms, such
as ’heap’, to small changes indicates that such terms do not have a sharp, definite
bound. By using neutrices to model such terms it should be possible to avoid the
paradox and explain the tolerance to small changes.
According to Keefe [21], degree theories fail to provide an acceptable account of
vagueness and are forced to make an implausible commitment to a unique numer-
ical assignment for each sentence. Smith [38] argues that an adequate account of
vagueness must involve degrees of truth and that the main objections to this theory
may be overcome. His fuzzy plurivaluationism theory seems overcomplicated for
the present approach to the Sorites paradox. I believe that the problem with the
fuzzy logic approach is the fact that precise numbers are used to model imprecise
predicates. On the contrary, with external numbers numbers it is possible to work
directly with imprecisions and errors without recourse to upper bounds, for they
have neither infimum nor supremum and are tolerant to appreciable (but not infin-
itely large) imprecisions. Moreover, since external numbers satisfy strong algebraic
laws, similar to the ones of the real numbers, those calculations are quite simple to
carry on.
A final remark concerns the strength of nonstandard axioms, which may intro-
duce undesirable consequences of external modelling. As such, within a nonstan-
dard theory, the proposed solution of the Sorites paradox
(1)


st (0)
∀n (st (n)→ st (n+ 1))
∃ω (¬st (ω))
implies, by the group property of the standard numbers, invariance by doubling,
i.e.
∀n (st (n)→ st (2n)) .
One easily imagines a soritical context where this is inappropriate. However,
(2) ∃n (st (n) ∧ ¬st (2n))
is consistent with (1). In such a context {(1), (2)} might be an acceptable axiom
system indeed, though of course at the price of losing some calculation properties.
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